The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in Patent Bullying

This Article presents an in-depth case study of a series of infringement suits filed by “patent bullies.” Unlike the oft-discussed “patent trolls”—which typically sell no products or services and perform no R&D—patent bullies are large, established operating companies that threaten or institute costly patent infringement actions of dubious merit against smaller companies, usually in order to suppress competition or garner licensing fees. In an ideal world of high-quality patents and optimal patent licensing and litigation, infringement suits by aggressive incumbents would have a cleansing, almost Darwinian effect. Yet, defects and distortions in patent examination, licensing, and litigation—the very problems that are raised constantly in the context of patent trolls—generally apply with equal and, often, greater force to patent bullies. Nonetheless, patent bullies have scarcely been discussed in the academic literature or popular press, especially in recent years. This Article examines three patent infringement suits filed by incumbent telecommunications carriers—Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T—against Vonage, then an early-stage company providing consumer telephone services over the Internet. Based on a detailed analysis of the patentsat-issue, prior art, court documents, and news accounts, it shows that the incumbents were able to exploit defects in the patent system in order to prevent disruptive technologies from competing with their outmoded products and services. Because startups like Vonage typically lack the resources to vigorously defend against even weak patent suits, patent bullying can result in severe anticompetitive effects. The incumbents in the Vonage suits achieved their intended result— drastically reducing Vonage’s stock price, severely weakening its position in the market, and placing it at the brink of insolvency. This case study demonstrates that further theoretical and empirical study is warranted to assess the full extent of the patent bullying problem

Patent Law Revisionism at the Supreme Court?

The Supreme Court generally may overrule, revise, or disregard its precedent. However, the Court lacks such discretion when Congress codifies prior judicial precedent. Yet, the Court has repeatedly subverted Congress’s codification of scienter standards for indirect patent infringement. This Essay describes in detail the Court’s bungled—essentially revisionist—interpretations of its precedent in Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. in 1964 and in Global-Tech v. SEB in 2011. Indeed, this Essay suggests that the Court in Global-Tech engaged in intentional obfuscation, very likely via a law clerk and unbeknownst the Justices. In the very least, the Justices abdicated their responsibility to fully review the applicable cases and legislative history in forming the decision

The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in Patent Bullying

This Article presents an in-depth case study of a series of infringement suits filed by “patent bullies.” Unlike the oft-discussed “patent trolls”—which typically sell no products or services and perform no R&D—patent bullies are large, established operating companies that threaten or institute costly patent infringement actions of dubious merit against smaller companies, usually in order to suppress competition or garner licensing fees. In an ideal world of high-quality patents and optimal patent licensing and litigation, infringement suits by aggressive incumbents would have a cleansing, almost Darwinian effect. Yet, defects and distortions in patent examination, licensing, and litigation—the very problems that are raised constantly in the context of patent trolls—generally apply with equal and, often, greater force to patent bullies. Nonetheless, patent bullies have scarcely been discussed in the academic literature or popular press, especially in recent years. This Article examines three patent infringement suits filed by incumbent telecommunications carriers—Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T—against Vonage, then an early-stage company providing consumer telephone services over the Internet. Based on a detailed analysis of the patentsat-issue, prior art, court documents, and news accounts, it shows that the incumbents were able to exploit defects in the patent system in order to prevent disruptive technologies from competing with their outmoded products and services. Because startups like Vonage typically lack the resources to vigorously defend against even weak patent suits, patent bullying can result in severe anticompetitive effects. The incumbents in the Vonage suits achieved their intended result— drastically reducing Vonage’s stock price, severely weakening its position in the market, and placing it at the brink of insolvency. This case study demonstrates that further theoretical and empirical study is warranted to assess the full extent of the patent bullying problem

Enforcement as Substance in Tax Compliance

It is well known that the government’s complete failure to enforce a law can nullify that law. But what are the effects of partial enforcement? This Article shows that imperfect enforcement can alter the de facto content of the written law in predictable and beneficial ways. Specifically, in the tax compliance context, even if perfect enforcement were costless, it would not always be socially optimal. When improving the substantive law is infeasible, th e enforcement agency can effect beneficial changes in the law by adopting a probabilistic enforcement scheme that varies according to the category of taxpayer and type of transaction. Our model shows that properly “measuring” enforcement in this manner can increase overall social welfare without reducing tax revenues. Unlike case-by-case discretionary enforcement, which often results in costly uncertainty, measured enforcement operates via systemic, published policies that legal actors can respond to predictably. Accordingly, measured enforcement can offer substantial benefits not readily obtained through traditional lawmaking or enforcement schemes

Enforcement as Substance in Tax Compliance

It is well known that the government\u27s complete failure to enforce a law can nullify that law. But what are the effects of partial enforcement? This Article shows that imperfect enforcement can alter the de facto content of the written law in predictable and beneficial ways. Specifically, in the tax compliance context, even if perfect enforcement were costless, it would not always be socially optimal. When improving the substantive law is infeasible, the enforcement agency can effect beneficial changes in the law by adopting a probabilistic enforcement scheme that varies according to the category of taxpayer and type of transaction. Our model shows that properly measuring enforcement in this manner can increase overall social welfare without reducing tax revenues. Unlike case-by-case discretionary enforcement, which often results in costly uncertainty, measured enforcement operates via systemic, published policies that legal actors can respond to predictably.Accordingly, measured enforcement can offer substantial benefits not readily obtained through additional lawmaking or enforcement schemes

The Case for Noncompetes

Scholars and other commentators widely assert that enforcement of contractual and other limitations on labor mobility deters innovation. Based on this view, federal and state legislators have taken, and continue to consider, actions to limit the enforcement of covenants not to compete in employment agreements. These actions would discard the centuries-old reasonableness standard that governs the enforcement of these provisions, often termed “noncompetes,” in all but four states (notably, California). We argue that this zero-enforcement position lacks a sound basis in theory or empirics. As a matter of theory, it overlooks the complex effects of contractual limitations on labor mobility in innovation markets. While it is frequently asserted that noncompetes may impede knowledge spillovers that foster innovation, it is frequently overlooked that noncompetes may encourage firms to invest in cultivating intellectual and human capital. As a matter of empirics, we show that two commonly referenced bodies of evidence fail to support zero enforcement. First, we revisit the conventional account of the rise of Silicon Valley and the purported fall of the Boston area as innovation centers, showing that this divergence cannot suitably be explained by differences in state law regarding noncompetes. Second, we show that widely cited empirical studies fail to support a causal relationship between non-competes, reduced labor mobility, and reduced innovation. Given these theoretical and empirical complexities, we propose an error-cost approach that provides an economic rationale for the common law’s reasonableness approach toward contractual constraints on the circulation of human capital

Patents as Promoters of Competition: The Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic

[T]his Article describes the artisan and merchant guild systems of the Venetian Republic. Part III explores the emergence of the patent system as a means for foreigners and Venetian citizens to compete with the guilds, as well as the eventual addition of negative exclusive rights to the basic license form of positive patent privileges. In so doing, contrary to the speculation of some scholars, we reject with near certainty the contention that the first patent law statute granting exclusionary rights for—in modern parlance—technological inventions was a silk-specific directive enacted by the Venetian Grand Council in the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century. Rather, the first record of a patent grant with exclusionary rights for such inventions is one by the Venetian Senate in 1416, and the first patent law statute was the Venetian Patent Act of 1474 (the 1474 Act). Part IV then considers the ramifications of patenting against the backdrop of a regulated economy. First, it explains how the evolution of patent laws in the West likely depended on the migration of the patent system from the highly regulated economy of Venice to less regulated economies in Europe. Second, it provides some reflections and lessons for the role of patents in today’s economy, showing that—like in the days of the Venetian Republic—patents can still function to promote competition

Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study

[T]he Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation--an organization that studies and promotes entrepreneurship in the United States--funded an effort at the University of California, Berkeley School of Law, to undertake the first comprehensive survey of the relationship between patenting and entrepreneurship in the United States. The authors, along with other investigators, administered the survey in 2008 to approximately 15,000 startup and early-stage companies in the biotechnology, medical device, information technology (IT) hardware, and software and Internet sectors. A portion of the survey examined why entrepreneurs, startups, and early-stage companies do (and do not) seek patents. This Article reports and analyzes results from that survey, showing that several widespread beliefs about startup firm patenting practices are very likely wrong. In brief, like the surveys of large firms, our respondents that hold patents report that the main motivation for patenting is to prevent others from copying their products and services. This result holds--and is statistically valid--across a variety of company characteristics, including firm age, revenues, industry, and patent portfolio size. Because we find that many young technology companies are holding patents, our results offer evidence that is somewhat at odds with frequently cited anecdotal reports that startups, especially in the software and Internet industries, generally do not use patents to protect against the erosion of their profits. We offer one important caveat, however. A substantial fraction of young firms are apparently opting out of the patent system altogether, and this observation is particularly true of companies in the software and Internet sectors. That said, our findings suggest that patent holding, and the strategic use of patents, is more widespread--even among young software and Internet companies--than commentators have previously reported. Additionally, we find--consistent with anecdotal reports--that many startups rely heavily on patents as signals to the market to improve their chances of raising financing, being acquired, and going public. Our results greatly contrast with previous large-firm studies, however, which showed relatively little reliance on patents for these kinds of signaling. Indeed, our results show that as the patent-holding firms in our sample become older and larger, they tend to rely less on patents as signals. This finding is also important because it lends some empirical support--which had been lacking--for the alternative signaling theories of patents, especially for younger startups. Like large firms, our respondents that hold patents report engaging in strategic patenting to help defend against patent infringement suits and to increase negotiating power, possibly for cross-licensing with other firms. Recognizing that startups--and not just those in the biotechnology field--find the strategic use of patents important is a novel finding. Nonetheless, we show that these young technology companies are especially sensitive to the costs of acquiring and enforcing patents, which--at nearly $40,000 per patent--are roughly double the reported average for all patentees. Thus, even though startup firms are well aware of the strategic uses of patents, resource constraints may mean that fewer of them can engage in these strategies as compared with large incumbents. To the extent that strategic patenting is positively related to firm success and survival, we highlight this finding as a policy concern deserving of further study, especially in industries--like electronics--with large numbers of incumbents engaging in similar strategic patenting

Data-Generating Patents

Patents and trade secrets are often considered economic substitutes. Under this view, inventors can decide either to maintain an invention as a trade secret or to seek a patent and disclose to the public the details of the invention. However, a handful of scholars have recognized that because the patent disclosure requirements are not always rigorous, inventors may sometimes be able to keep certain aspects of an invention secret, yet still receive a patent to the invention as a whole. Here, we provide further insight into how trade secrets and patents may act as complements. Specifically, we introduce the concept of “data-generating patents,” which refer to patents on inventions involving technologies that by design generate valuable data through their operation or use. For instance, genetic tests and medical devices produce data about patients. Internet search engines and social networking websites generate data about the interests of consumers. When data-generating inventions are patented, and the patentee enjoys market power over the invention, by implication, the patentee also effectively enjoys market power over the data generated by the invention. Trade secret law further protects the patentee’s market power over the data, even where that data is in a market distinct from the patented invention and especially after the patent expires or is invalidated. We contend that the use of patents and trade secrets as complements in this manner may sometimes yield socially harmful results. We identify the conditions under which such results occur and make several recommendations to mitigate their effects